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The high degree of persistence in the national in°ation di®erentials of the
majority of EMU Member States observed since the introduction of the euro
has raised serious concerns among researchers and policy-makers alike. In this
paper I review the main theoretical arguments which explain their existence
within a monetary union and, by means of econometric methods, analyze their
dynamic behavior prior and after the introduction of the euro. Furthermore I
investigate, through single-equation GMM and panel TSLS estimations, the em-
pirical evidence for di®erent degrees of correlation between the country-speci¯c
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11 Introduction
With the culmination of the monetary uni¯cation process by the Member States of
the European Monetary Union (EMU) represented by the abolition of their national
currencies and the adoption of the euro, the degree of wage and price °exibility at the
national level became particularly important for the macroeconomic stability of the
participating economies as well as for the EMU as a whole. Indeed, in the absence of
country-speci¯c nominal exchange rates and monetary policy conduction implied by
a monetary uni¯cation, the country-speci¯c wage and price developments are likely
to gain a much more important role as macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms to
internal and external imbalances through their e®ect on the real exchange rates
and therefore on the competitiveness of the di®erent economies. Their ability to
ful¯ll this function, nevertheless, depends in a signi¯cant manner on their degree of
persistence and therefore on their capability to react in a quick and su±cient manner
to those shocks.
In this light, the high degree of persistence of most of the national in°ation
rate di®erentials of the EMU Member States observed in the years posterior to the
introduction of the euro has raised serious concerns among researchers and policy
makers alike: Because the di®erences in the national in°ation rates seem not to
be caused by accordant developments in the productivity in those economies, the
relative competitiveness of the member countries might su®er from signi¯cant shifts
in the medium run, with serious consequences for the future developments of output
and employment.
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the dynamic behavior of the na-
tional in°ation rates in the euro area and the linkage between their dispersion and
persistence to the country-speci¯c business cycles prior and after the monetary uni-
¯cation from both the theoretical and the empirical point of view. This study is
organized as follows. In section 2 I brie°y overview the main theoretical explana-
tions for the existence of in°ation di®erentials in a common currency area, with
special focus on the EMU. In section 3 the process of convergence of the national
in°ation rates prior to the introduction of the euro as well as their dynamic be-
havior after that date is analyzed by econometric convergence and stationary tests.
Structural in°ation adjustment equations as well as in°ation di®erential equations
for selected EMU countries are estimated and discussed in section 4, in order to
¯nd structural explanations for the observed persistent in°ation di®erentials in the
EMU. Section 5 concludes.
22 In°ation Di®erentials within Monetary Unions: Main
Causes and Consequences
In the new macroeconomic environment resulting from a monetary uni¯cation and
the related disappearance of the country-speci¯c nominal exchange rates, other
macroeconomic characteristics such as the mobility of the production factors and the
degree of wage and price °exibility obtain an even more important role as macroe-
conomic adjustment mechanisms to asymmetric shocks at the national level.1
The empirical evidence concerning the mobility of the factors of production in
the European Monetary Union is twofold: While the factor capital is found to have
become highly mobile across the EMU members, the degree of labor mobility in
the EMU has remained much lower, primarily due to the language and cultural
barriers among the EMU Member States. Concerning these countries, De Grauwe
and Vanhaverbeke (1993, p.124) ¯nd that , \at the national level, there is almost
no labor mobility but signi¯cantly more exchange rate variability". These ¯ndings
are in line with Meltzer (1986), whereafter in a monetary union as the EMU2 more
of the adjustment to asymmetric shocks will take the form of real exchange rate
changes than of labor mobility.
In the absence of the country-speci¯c nominal exchange rate channel, e®ective
adjustments of the real exchange rate to macroeconomic internal or external imbal-
ances at the national level can only take place through wage and price adjustments.
In a monetary union with low labor mobility as the EMU, thus, \in°ation di®eren-
tials are [...] the product of an equilibrating adjustment process within a monetary
1According to the Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) theory developed after the work by Mundell
(1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), a high mobility of the factors of production, and
especially of labor, is a central pre-condition for countries to be adequate candidates for a common
currency area. Only in a currency union with high interregional factor mobility, asymmetric shocks
do not represent a threat for the internal stability of the former because the regional labor markets
are able to absorb these shocks in a quick and e±cient manner by reorganizing the distribution of the
labor force within the regions. In such a case, the currency union's central monetary authorities are
thus able to focus on the currency union's external balance, once the internal balance was assured
by the high interregional labor mobility.
2Since the EMU is the focus of this study I will not stick throughout this paper to the di®eren-
tiated de¯nition of a monetary and a currency union, after which a monetary union characterizes
a single market with a common currency, while a currency union does not involve the existence of
a single market, i.e. it does not rule out the existence of trade barriers, tari®s, etc. between the
currency union members (obviously, the trade e®ects in a monetary union will be higher than in a
currency union), but I will use both terms interchangeably.
3union and, as such, are not only unavoidable, but also desirable."3 Now, while the full
equality of the in°ation rates of monetary union members is indeed an undesirable
situation which would hinder the individual adjustment of the di®erent economies
to asymmetric shocks, a similar dynamic behavior of the national in°ation rates is
desirable due to a variety of aspects: In the ¯rst place, similar national in°ation rates
imply also similar real interest rates, and therefore more uniform monetary policy
impulses across the monetary union. In the second place, similar in°ation rates im-
ply stable bilateral real exchange rates among the monetary union's members, and
therefore also a balanced competitiveness development among them. Furthermore,
similar in°ation rates are likely to lead to similar in°ationary expectations in the
member countries, making for the central bank the control of in°ation at a currency
area wide level easier. On the contrary, if the national in°ation rates persistently
di®er from each other and subsequently the national in°ation di®erentials are up-
wardly or downwardly biased from the monetary union's average level, an unstable
macroeconomic development of the monetary union members might occur, as it will
be discussed in the next sections.
At this point it should be stressed that the entrance in a monetary union im-
plies for the joining countries a radical regime change in their macroeconomic en-
vironment for a variety of reasons which go way beyond the loss of an indepen-
dent monetary policy to react to exogenous shocks and the disappearance of the
country-speci¯c nominal exchange rates: With the entrance in a monetary union,
macroeconomic patterns such as the wage bargaining processes or the in°ationary
expectations formation of a country valid before it joined the monetary union are
likely to change after the adoption of the new common currency, in the sense of the
Lucas's (1976) Critique. Additionally, due to the reduction of the nominal exchange
rate risk and of the transaction costs resulting from the monetary uni¯cation, to the
subsequent higher economic integration and international trade among the monetary
union members as well as to the higher regional production specialization\countries
that enter a currency union are likely to experience dramatically di®erent business
cycles as before."
In the following section I brie°y review the main structural and cyclical factors
which, at least theoretically, could explain the existence of in°ation rate di®erentials
3ECB (2005, p.61). See ECB (2003) and Fritsche, Logeay, Lommatzsch, Rietzler, Stephan
and Zwiener (2005) for an extensive discussion of the main causes for in°ation di®erentials in the
European Monetary Union.
4(and their persistence) in a monetary union,4 and discuss the possible consequences
of the existence of persistent in°ation di®erentials for the macroeconomic behavior
of monetary union members.
2.1 Structural Factors
Tradable and Non-Tradable Goods Price Level Convergence: Due to the
important process of real convergence and the high economic integration resulting
from the monetary uni¯cation, many observers have interpreted the persistent in-
°ation di®erentials among the EMU member countries mainly as a consequence of
the Balassa-Samuelson (BS) e®ect5 resulting from the catching-up process of low to
high income EMU members.
In the Balassa-Samuelson framework, the production structure of the economies
can be clearly di®erentiated between tradable and non-tradable goods, and labor is
assumed to be perfectly mobile within a country across these two sectors. Under
conditions of perfect competition, pro¯t maximization in both sectors implies
p
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N denote the growth rate of labor productivity in the tradables
and non-tradables production sector, respectively. Under the assumption of perfect
goods market integration across the countries of a monetary union and the absence
of arbitrage possibilities, the in°ation rate of the tradable goods is the same across




T i = 1;:::N:
4Here I do not focus on additional methodological issues concerning the composition of basket of
goods of the Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HCPI) since, as discussed in Alberola (2000, p.60),
the di®erences in the weights of the goods in the representative basket of the EMU members, while
containing some information, are not fundamental for the explanation of the extent and persistence
of in°ation di®erentials in the euro area.
5Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964).
5This, nevertheless, does not necessarily hold for the in°ation rate of the non-tradable
goods in the di®erent economies. If the aggregate price level can be expressed as
a Cobb-Douglas function of both tradable and non-tradable goods, the aggregate
in°ation rate in country i can be expressed as











Since the production of tradable goods is usually more capital intensive and there-
fore gains more from technological process than the non-tradable goods production,
a higher growth rate of labor productivity in the ¯rst production sector is to be
expected. When labor productivity grows in the tradable goods sector, wages in
that sector can rise without leading to an increase in the price tradable goods. Nev-
ertheless, due to the assumed intersectoral labor mobility, the nominal wage in the
non-tradable sector is likely to increase to the same extent, despite of the lower pro-
ductivity growth in that sector. The result is an increase in the non-tradable goods
prices and therefore also in the general price level.
For the in°ation di®erentials between two countries i and j, or between country's
i in°ation rate ¼i and the monetary union's average ¼MU, it follows









implying that the di®erence between the national and the monetary union's av-
erage in°ation rates arise from the sector and country di®erences in productivity.
According to eq.(3), the existence of in°ation di®erentials is caused solely by di®er-
ent structural factors concerning the production schemes between two countries, or
alternatively, by the di®erences between their economic development.
Despite of its apparent high explanatory power for the existence of in°ation rate
di®erentials in a monetary union, the Balassa-Samuelson model exhibits nevertheless
a variety of conceptual and empirical shortcomings. At the conceptual level, in the
¯rst place, situations are possible where a catching up e®ect might take place with
productivity growth equally high in both the tradable and non-tradable sectors. In
this case the explaining content of the BS model would vanish, since the catching up
e®ect would occur without exerting any pressure on the aggregate price levels. In the
second place, the di®erentiation of the production structure of an economy between
a tradable and a non-tradable goods sector is in the actual world almost impossible,
due to the high integration of goods at all stages of the production process. In the
third place, the BS model assumes constant production elasticities in both sectors,
while in reality they are likely to be endogenously determined. Additionally, on
6empirical grounds, the econometric studies by Alberola (2000), Sinn and Reutter
(2000), Ortega (2003) and Lommatzsch and Tober (2004) ¯nd that the Balassa-
Samuelson e®ect is not able to explain the in°ation di®erentials in the euro area due
to the size and persistence of the latter, since \it appears that the actual [in°ation
di®erentials] between groups of countries have been signi¯cantly larger than what
the BS model would imply."6
Exchange Rate Pass-Through: The extent of the exchange rate pass-through
on the aggregate domestic price levels of the di®erent countries and therefore on
the in°ation di®erentials between them depends on the degree of openness of their
economies and on their production pro¯le, i.e. on their dependence on foreign inter-
mediate and energy goods. Obviously, the in°uence of external factors on the price
level varies with the measure of the price level which is used: Concerning producer
prices and the GDP de°ator, these are a®ected by external e®ects only to the extent
up to which foreign intermediate goods are used in the production of domestic ¯nal
goods. If on the contrary the consumer price index (CPI) is analyzed, as done in the
majority of empirical studies on in°ation dispersion such as Busetti, Forni, Harvey
and Venditti (2006), nominal exchange rate °uctuations a®ect the development of
the CPI additionally through the share of foreign goods in the consumer basket.
In°ation dispersion measures based on the national CPI will thus be biased by the
import price dimension, since the CPI depends to a higher extent on exogenous,
foreign shocks (through the role of the import prices) than the GDP de°ator or the
producer price index. In this regard ECB (2003, p.18) ¯nds that \import prices
tend to account for the in°ation di®erentials of most countries with a relatively
high degree of openness and/or dependency [with the Netherlands being a notably
exception]".
Degree of In°ation Persistence: As discussed for example in ECB (2003), while
the existence of national in°ation rate di®erentials across the EMU Member States
is inevitable and even more, desirable as an adjustment mechanism to asymmetric,
country-speci¯c shocks, a high degree of persistence of these in°ation di®erentials
above or below the monetary union's average might, through its cumulative e®ect,
lead to signi¯cant shifts in the relative competitiveness positions of the monetary
union's members. Indeed, while persistent in°ation rate di®erentials arising from
6ECB (2003, p.34). See also De Grauwe (1996), Alberola and TyrvÄ ainen (1998), De Grauwe and
Skudelny (2000) and for similar ¯ndings.
7corresponding di®erences in the productivity levels of the respective countries might
not be a source of macroeconomic instability but rather an expression of the catch-
up mechanism of less developed to more developed economies, persistent in°ation
rate di®erentials arising solely from the persistence in the price setting behavior by
¯rms might represent a danger for the medium run sustainability of the currency
area.
As it will be shown below, the degree of in°ation persistence within the member
economies is likely to explain an important share of the in°ation di®erentials within
a currency union: When nominal wages and prices are sticky and react only in a
delayed and slow manner to exogenous shocks, di®erences in the in°ation rates of
the member countries of a monetary union might be of greater magnitude and longer
duration as in the case where wages and prices are °exible and the degree of in°ation
persistence is low. As stated in ECB (2005, p.63), \since the late 1980s there has
been evidence of an ongoing increase in the cyclical synchronization of euro area
countries. [...] At the same time, in°ation di®erentials in the euro area appear to
be very persistent, in the sense that many countries have systematically maintained
either a positive or a negative in°ation gap against the euro area average since the
introduction of the euro".7
2.2 Business Cycle Related Factors
Business Cycle Synchronization and Country-Speci¯c Shocks: Besides the
structural factors discussed above, a main determinant of the in°ation rate of a
country is its actual position within its business cycle, that is the extent of the
actual excess aggregate demand: While a high excess aggregate demand is likely to
lead, due to capacity constraints and the eventual price-setting power of the ¯rms,
to an increase in the growth rate of the price level, with a low excess aggregate
demand the growth rate of the price level is likely to fall, due to the reluctance from
side of the ¯rms to carry the burden of storage costs in case of overproduction. In
a monetary union consisting of di®erent countries, di®erences between the actual
position of the di®erent economies within their respective business cycles are likely
7A further possible explanation for the di®erent degree of in°ation di®erentials persistence in
the U.S. and the euro area could be delivered by the empirical ¯ndings of Flaschel and Krolzig
(2006) and Proa~ no, Flaschel, Ernst and Semmler (2006): Thereafter the degree of wage and price
°exibility to labor and goods market pressures, respectively, is higher in the U.S. than in the euro
area. This could explain why, compared to the in°ation rate di®erentials across U.S. regions, the
in°ation di®erentials in the euro area feature a much higher degree of persistence.
8to explain to an important extent the existence of in°ation di®erentials among them.
The characteristics of the national business cycles are in turn likely to be af-
fected by the monetary uni¯cation of the participating countries to a signi¯cant
extent. Nevertheless, both at the theoretical and the empirical level, there is still
no consensus on whether countries within a monetary union are likely to have more
or less national business cycles. On the one hand, according to Kenen (1969),
Eichengreen (1990), Krugman (1993) and Krugman and Venables (1996), a higher
economic integration is likely to increase the degree of regional production special-
ization in the monetary union countries, and therefore the disparity in the regional
economic development in the presence of high interregional labor mobility and asym-
metric, industry-speci¯c shocks, reducing the correlation between their business cy-
cles, whereas, as Frankel and Rose (1998, p.1014) state, \Increased trade results in
greater specialization if most trade is inter-industry. [...] If much trade is within
rather than between industries, these specialization e®ects may be small."8 On the
other hand, after Frankel and Rose (1998) and Rose and Engel (2002), more inter-
national trade is likely to result in more highly correlated business cycles. Rose and
Engel (2002, p.1084) show, by regressing the pairwise correlations of detrended real
GDP between the euro area countries on a variety of macroeconomic variables as
well as currency union dummies, that\countries that are members of a common cur-
rency union tend to have more highly synchronized business cycles; the correlation
is perhaps .1 higher on average for currency union members than for non-members.
[Nevertheless,] while economically and statistically signi¯cant, the size of this e®ect
is small in an absolute sense." The European Commision (2004, p.29), in turn,
shows, by calculating the output gap correlation among EMU members, other Eu-
ropean countries and the U.S., that\cyclical synchronization has tended to be much
higher between euro-area Member States than between the euro area and other
EU-countries (EU-3) or the USA."
Besides of the in°uence of the regular business cycles °uctuations on the in°ation
gaps between the di®erent countries, the occurrence of asymmetric, country-speci¯c
shocks is also likely to a®ect, at least temporarily, the relative dynamic behavior
of the national price levels in a monetary union, due to the increased adjustment
role of respective wages and prices in the absence of the country-speci¯c nominal
exchange rate.
8According to Deroose, Langedijk and Roeger (2004, p.8), \depending on the de¯nition, intra-
industry trade is about twice as important within the euro area than inter-industry trade".
9In both cases, the resulting dynamic behavior of wages and prices is likely to a®ect
the country's level of economic activity through a variety of channels, being the real
interest rate and the competitiveness channels the most important ones. Now, while
the competitiveness channel is likely to act in a stabilizing manner (high in°ation
rates caused by an excessive aggregate demand lead to a real appreciation of the
prices of the domestic goods and a subsequent loss of competitiveness which in turn,
through a reduction of the net exports, cools down the level of economic activity),
the real interest channel is likely to operate in the opposite direction: Thereafter
high in°ation rates caused again by an overheating economic activity lower the real
interest rate, boosting furthermore aggregate investment and therefore aggregate
demand.
Asymmetric Monetary Impulses: With a single monetary policy e®ective for
all monetary union members, the existence of di®erent national in°ation rates im-
plies di®erent real interest rates in the respective economies and therefore also dif-
ferent monetary policy impulses across the monetary union members.9 In such a
macroeconomic environment, the extent up to which the participating countries are
indeed a®ected by asymmetric, country-speci¯c shocks, and therefore the extent up
to which their business cycles are correlated { and in a more updated sense the de-
gree of synchronization { with each other, is a key feature for the e®ectiveness and
adequateness of monetary policy in a monetary union.10
Indeed, since in a monetary union with a single Central Bank a common, one-
size-¯ts-all monetary policy oriented at the macroeconomic conditions (economic
activity and price stability) of the whole monetary union, might not be su±cient to
guarantee price stability and a high employment level in the individual economies.
Because the national in°ation rates enter only in a weighted manner in the aggregate
currency area indicator, the Taylor (1993) principle { which demands the monetary
policy reaction to overact against in°ation to be su±ciently e®ective { might, at least
theoretically, not be ful¯lled: A relative small country in a monetary union which is
relatively close in its economic structure, might persistently achieve an above average
9See e.g. European Commision (2004, p.32).
10As already discussed above and recognized by Mundell (1961), if factor (and specially labor)
mobility is not high between the monetary union countries, the existence of asymmetric (country-
or region-speci¯c) shocks will complicate in a signi¯cant manner the conduction of monetary policy
by the central authorities. Only if regions (or countries) are normally exposed to similar exogenous
shocks and therefore share similar business cycles, the single monetary policy will bring advantages
to all monetary union participants.
10economic activity through higher-than-average in°ation { and therefore through
lower-than-average real interest rates {, due to the low weight of its national in°ation
rates in the monetary unions average.11 Due to this, the relative strength of the
competitiveness and the real interest rate channels is even quite important for the
medium run macroeconomic performance of countries within a monetary union.
Besides the operative role of monetary policy pursuing price stability at the
monetary union's level, the central monetary authorities also set a medium term
nominal anchor through its in°uence on the expectations of the economic agents
and therefore also on the wage bargaining processes which take place at the national
level in the MU countries. Indeed, in the medium run, the in°ationary expectations
in the member countries of a monetary union will, in theory, converge to the currency
area wide in°ation rate targeted by the central monetary authorities, given that they
possess enough credibility by the economic agents within the monetary union.12
3 In°ation Di®erentials in EMU: Convergence and Sta-
tionarity Analysis
The convergence of the national in°ation rates { and therefore the reduction of the
national in°ation rate di®erentials { to a similar (and low) level was considered
by the EMU architects a prerequisite for the monetary uni¯cation and a necessary
condition for the future sustainability of the EMU: Indeed, one of the convergence
criteria for joining the European Monetary Union established by the Maastricht
Treaty 1992 was the \the achievement of a high degree of price stability; this will
be apparent from rate of in°ation which is close to that of, at most, the three best
performing Member States in terms of price stability".13
11The asymmetrical distribution of burdens and bene¯ts of joining a monetary union for large and
small open economies was denoted by Tavlas (1994) as a \problem of inconsistency", see Mongelli
(2002, p.12).
12An extrapolation of this line of thought would lead to the conclusion that under the assumption
of increasingly synchronized national business cycles and homogeneous in°ationary expectations of
the economic agents across the monetary union, the dispersion of the actual price in°ation rates
should decrease over time, since the national in°ation rate di®erentials would behave in a similar
manner across the monetary union.
13The convergence criteria are established in article 121 x 1 and in protocol 21 of the Treaty
on European Union (url: http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html). The other convergence
criteria established therein are
² \the sustainability of the government ¯nancial position; this will be apparent from having
11In line with the Maastricht criteria of nominal convergence, during the years
previous to Stage Three of EMU (the culmination of the monetary uni¯cation process
with the introduction of the euro), a signi¯cant process of convergence of the national
in°ation rates to a similar low level (and therefore also a signi¯cant reduction in their
dispersion) could be observed in all eleven candidate countries, as shown in ¯gures
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Figure 1: In°ation Di®erentials: Unweighted Standard Deviation of EU-12, EU-11
(EU-12 less Greece) and EU-10 (EU-11 less Portugal)
di®erentials among the EU-12 group fell from 0.03 in 1991 to 0.01 in 1999, at the
time of the introduction of the euro. Now, while a reduction in the dispersion of the
in°ation di®erentials might reduce eventual asymmetric e®ects of the common one-
size-¯ts-all monetary policy of the ECB across the EMU members as discussed in the
achieved a government budgetary position without a de¯cit that is excessive as determined
in accordance with Article 104c(6);
² the observance of the normal °uctuation margins provided for by the Exchange Rate Mech-
anism of the European Monetary System, for at least two years, without devaluing against
the currency of any other Member State;
² the durability of convergence achieved by the Member State and of its participation in the
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System being re°ected in the long-
term interest rate levels."
14Throughout this analysis we will focus on the EU-11 group and will leave Greece aside due to
the widely-known lack of reliability of the Greek macroeconomic data prior to its joining to EMU.
12previous section, this measure does not tell much about the individual development
in the respective countries, and more importantly, it does not deliver much insight in
the consequences for the di®erentials in the national price levels resulting from the
in°ation rate di®erentials. Indeed, as discussed in De Grauwe (1996), the criterion of
convergence of the in°ation rates, as postulated by the Maastricht Treaty, might not
be appropriate to ensure the future sustainability of a monetary union as the EMU,
since a\convergence in yearly in°ation rates can hide increasing divergences of trends
in price levels, when the same countries have small but consistently higher in°ation
rates than other countries."15 Not the convergence but the non-persistence of a one-
sided divergence is what is determining for a balanced medium run macroeconomic
development of the member countries of a monetary union as a group. As stated
before, di®erent countries may have from time to time in°ation rates di®erent from
the currency union's average as a result of the national adjustment to asymmetric
shocks; Nevertheless, as discussed before, when these di®erentials are persistently
positive or negative, they might lead to ongoing shifts in the relative competitiveness
position of the member countries.
Figure 2 shows the dynamic path of the national in°ation di®erentials with re-
spect to the EMU average for selected Member States: As it can be observed there,
the national in°ation rates have been persistently above or below the EMU average
not only at EMU Stage II (what could be attributed to a wage and price rigidity
which could have slowed down the nominal convergence process), but, more problem-
atically, also after the o±cial introduction of the euro (EMU Stage III) in January
1999. This pattern is also observable if the gaps between the national in°ation rates
and the levels determined by the Maastricht convergence criterion, that is, the av-
erage of the three lowest in°ation rates of the EMU Member States, are taken into
account, as shown in ¯gure 3.
In order to provide a graphical notion of the cumulative e®ects of persistently
above or below average in°ation rates for the relative medium run competitiveness
of the EMU members, we show in ¯gure 4 the cumulated in°ation and nominal unit
labor costs di®erentials of selected EMU member countries. As it is clearly observ-
able there, while the signi¯cant persistence of these two macroeconomic indicators
also after the monetary uni¯cation 1999 has lead to a clear signi¯cant enhancing in
the competitiveness of Germany and Austria, it has lead to the opposite result in
Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands.
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Figure 2: In°ation Di®erentials (to EMU Average) of selected EMU Countries
Whether this development has been caused by the drop out of punishing mecha-
nisms for countries not ful¯lling the Maastricht criteria after their joining to EMU,
and the resulting \non cooperative" behavior of some EMU countries after 1999 or
contrarily it has been the result of other structural problems such as a high degree of
nominal rigidities, or whether it is only the re°ection of the macroeconomic adjust-
ment mechanisms acting in a monetary union, is an issue which will be approached
in section 4.
In the analysis of this section, on the contrary, we investigate the possible
¯¡convergence of the national in°ation rate di®erentials to the EMU average.16
In Barro and Sala-i Martin (1991) and Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992)'s terms, ¯
convergence is present if di®erent cross-sectional time series show a mean revert-
16The concepts of ¯- and the ¾ convergence date back on Barro and Sala-i Martin's (1991) analysis
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Figure 3: In°ation Di®erentials (to Maastricht Convergence Criterion)
ing behavior to a common level . ¾ convergence, the other convergence criterion,
concerns on the contrary the reduction of the overall dispersion of the time series.
Following previous empirical analyses on in°ation di®erentials as Mentz and Se-
bastian (2003), Beck and Weber (2005) and Busetti et al. (2006), we use unit root
and stationary tests to investigate the dynamic behavior of the national CPI in°ation
rate di®entials (to the EMU average) prior to and after the monetary uni¯cation.
Nevertheless, our approach di®ers from these studies in a variety of aspects: While
Mentz and Sebastian (2003) employ the Johansen procedure to test for possible
cointegrating relationships between the levels of the national in°ation rates, I fo-
cus on the eventual process of convergence and stationary of the national in°ation
di®erentials to the euro area average { obviously, the presence of a cointegrating re-
lationship between the levels of the national in°ation rates, as investigated in Mentz




































Figure 4: Cumulated In°ation and Nominal Unit Labor Costs Di®erentials of se-
lected EMU countries
et al. (2006) also follow a similar strategy by performing unit root and stationarity
tests on the bilateral in°ation di®erentials of all EMU countries: Indeed, as discussed
in Harvey and Carvalho (2002), while the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) or the
Phillips-Perron unit root tests as are adequate to test whether two time series tend
to converge to a similar level after being hit by an exogenous shock, stationarity
tests as for example proposed in Kwiatkowsky, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992),
are suitable to test whether those series have converged, that is if they tend to remain
at similar levels after a similar shock.
The strategy goes as follows: For the sub-period prior to the creation of the EMU
(EMU Stage II), univariate unit root tests on the national in°ation di®erentials are
performed in order to check for statistical evidence on the convergence process. For
the subperiod after the monetary uni¯cation (EMU Stage III), stationary tests on
the same time series are calculated. This separate hypothesis testing on the two
subperiods makes particularly sense due to the regime change discussed by Frankel
and Rose (1998), whereafter the behavior of the economic agents can change so
signi¯cantly due to the monetary uni¯cation that previous valid parameters are likely
to lose explanatory power for the macroeconomic developments after the monetary
uni¯cation.
The data set used in this section stems from the OECD Main Economic Indica-
tors database. In order to have a representative sample size, monthly data of the
national Consumer Price Indices is used (nevertheless, since monthly data is not
16available for Ireland, we do not include this country in our analysis).17 The national
in°ation rate ¼i;t is measured as the annual percentage change in the CPI, the de-
viation of country's i national in°ation rate from the euro area's aggregate in°ation
rate at time t is denoted 'i;t = ¼i;t ¡ ¼mu
t .18
3.1 Univariate Convergence and Stationarity Tests
The simplest univariate representation of the Data Generating Process (DGP) of
the national in°ation di®erentials is an AR(1) process
'i;t = ½'i;t¡1 + ® + ±t + ²i;t; (4)
where ® denotes a time-invariant drift term and t represents a linear time trend.
The reformulation of eq.(4) as an AR(p) process in error-correction form which
additionally incorporates lagged di®erences of 'i;t in order to control for eventual
serial correlation, delivers
¢'i;t = Á'i;t¡1 +
pi X
j=1
°i;j¢'i;t¡j + ®¤ + ±¤t + ²i;t; (5)
with Á = ½ ¡ 1, ®¤ = (1 ¡ ½)® and ±¤ = (1 ¡ ½)±, which is the equation normally
used by standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests.19 Hereby the
null hypothesis H0 : ½ = 1 is tested against H1 : ½ < 1.20 It should be easily
observable that for ½ < 1, a mean reverting behavior in the levels of the in°ation
rate di®erentials would be observed. The speci¯c value of ½, furthermore, provides
some information about the speed of convergence of the analyzed time series.
An important question arises in this respect when the analysis concerns specif-
ically in°ation di®erentials, namely whether a constant should be included or not
17The use of the Harmonized Consumer Price Indices (HCPI) { available only from 1995 { would,
despite of being the \more correct" variable, have reduced signi¯cantly the number of available
observations and therefore also the explanatory power of the performed unit root tests.
18The analysis of the in°ation rate di®erentials with respect to the euro area average instead of
the simple levels controls additionally for cross-section dependence, see Beck and Weber (2005, p.7).
19To check for the robustness of the ADF test results, we perform also Phillips-Perron unit root
tests, which correct in a di®erent, non-parametric manner as the ADF tests for serial correlation.
Those statistics are reported in the appendix of this paper.
20As stated before, Mentz and Sebastian (2003) follow an alternative though equivalent strategy:
using the Johansen procedure, they test for cointegrating relationships between the levels (not the
di®erentials) of national in°ation rates. Obviously, in presence of cointegration between the in°ation
rate levels, the di®erentials between them would be stationary.
17in eq.(5). Busetti et al. (2006) state that when testing for in°ation di®erentials,
the focus should be on absolute convergence, with the consequence that no constant
should be included in the test. In our view, such speci¯cation strategy is likely to
bias the test results, since a certain behavior of the time series, namely relative con-
vergence, is a priori factored out. Especially concerning the observed persistence in
the national in°ation rates, the (eventual) value of the constant could also contain
some information about their degree of persistence. Due to this reason we believe
that a constant should be included when testing for unit root in a ¯rst stage and
only be excluded from a new computation in the second stage if it is statistically
insigni¯cant under the normal distribution.
With respect to the inclusion of a deterministic linear (!) time trend in (5), it
should be clear that its statistical signi¯cance in eq.(5) would imply trend-stationary
for the in°ation rate di®erential, because ±¤ > 0 also implies that ½ < 0, since
±¤ = (1 ¡ ½)±). A trend-stationary in°ation di®erential of country i implies that a)
from the beginning it will diverge upwards or downwards the euro area average if the
national in°ation rate lied close to the monetary union's average or b) after having
reached the currency area average at a certain point, it would diverge (upwards or
downwards) again, depending on whether at the starting point country i's in°ation
di®erential was below or above the currency area average. These two implications
would speak against the inclusion of a linear time trend in the convergence tests
equations. Nevertheless, due to the regime change caused by the monetary uni¯ca-
tion discussed in Frankel and Rose (1998), such outcomes might not occur, since the
linear time trend might lose validity for the dynamics of the in°ation rate gaps due
to the possible change in the behavior of the economic agents.
Concerning the second subperiod, I use the Kwiatkowsky et al. (1992) (KPSS)
test to check for the stationary of the national in°ation rate gaps after the introduc-
tion of the euro. The main di®erence between the KPSS test and the unit root tests
discussed in the previous section is the de¯nition of the null hypothesis: While in the
¯rst mentioned tests the null is the existence of a unit root, in the KPSS under the
null the analyzed time series is stationary. To test for this hypothesis, Kwiatkowsky
et al. (1992) use the residuals of the OLS regression of the analyzed series yt on the
set of exogenous variables Xt,
't = X0
t± + ut (6)
where Xt can consist of a constant or a constant and a deterministic time trend.
Under the null of the KPSS test, yt is assumed to be level or trend stationary.
18Now, for my analysis of national in°ation rate di®erentials, not only the eventual
stationarity of the time series, but also the level around which these time series can
be considered to be stationary is important: a stationarity around a nonzero level
would imply a persistence in the in°ation rate di®erentials, and therefore a sustained
gain or loss of relative competitiveness towards the other Member States, depending
whether the nonzero level is below or above zero. As it will be discussed below,
such a dynamic behavior of the national in°ation di®erentials in the EMU will be
con¯rmed for many countries by my econometric estimation results.
Table 1: National Annual In°ation Rate Di®erentials (to EMU average): Univariate
ADF Unit Root Tests
Subsample: 1990:1 - 1997:12 1998:1 - 2005:12
No Intercept With Intercept No Intercept
Country Á p-val
¤ Á p-val
¤ const. t-stat Á p-val
¤
AUT -.0544 .0544 -.1333 .0788 -.0010 .0557 -.0770 .0981
BEL -.0164 .3063 -.0545 .4977 -.0006 .2110 -.1062 .0827
DEU -.0366 .0688 -.0387 .5327 -3.8E-5 .8977 -.0206 .3366
ESP -.0437 .0566 -.1110 .2232 .0008 .1473 -.0050 .6062
FIN -.0313 .1115 -.0834 .0344 -.0013 .0082 -.0218 .3336
FRA -.0082 .3939 -.0224 .8256 -.0002 .6118 -.0266 .3046
ITA -.0264 .1332 -.0442 .5729 .0002 .4885 -.0569 .1568
LUX -.0233 .2326 -.0828 .4700 -.0008 .2085 -.1612 .0495
NLD -.0256 .0778 -.0229 .7862 4.7E-5 .8985 -.0400 .1452
PRT -.0217 .0499 -.0218 .6408 6.1E-6 .9933 -.0300 .1977
Note: * denotes MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Table 1 contains a variety of interesting and somewhat concerning results. In
the ¯rst place, concerning the univariate ADF unit root tests results,21 we ¯nd in
the ¯rst subsample from 1990:1-1997:12 a very di®erentiated picture of the absolute
convergence process of the in°ation di®erentials among the EMU countries. Indeed,
when the ADF tests are computed without the intercept, as proposed by Busetti
et al. (2006), only for Portugal, the country with the most remarkable disin°ation
process besides Greece, the H1 hypothesis of absolute convergence cannot be rejected
at the 5% signi¯cance level. At the 10% level, this hypothesis cannot be rejected
additionally for Austria, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands, and with some tol-
21Alternatively, we computed Phillips-Perron unit root tests with nearly the same results. These
univariate and panel Phillips-Perron tests can be found in the appendix of this paper.
19erance, Italy. If not absolute, but relative or conditional convergence is tested by
including an intercept in the ADF tests, we ¯nd statistically signi¯cant coe±cients
also for Finland. For the remaining countries, Belgium, France and Luxembourg, we
¯nd a completely di®erent dynamic behavior of their national in°ation di®erentials:
For these economies, the null of a non-convergent dynamic behavior of the national
in°ation di®erentials cannot be rejected at standard con¯dence levels, even when a
linear trend is included (not reported in table 1).
In order to investigate the degree of persistence in the national in°ation rate






Table 2 shows the speed of convergence of the in°ation di®erentials of the EMU
Table 2: In°ation Di®erentials to EMU Average: Computed Half Lives
Country AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA ITA LUX NLD PRT
Subsample: 1990:1 - 1997:12
¿ 12.39 41.91 18.58 15.51 21.79 84.18 25.90 25.90 26.72 31.59
Subsample: 1998:1 - 2005:12
¿ 8.65 6.173 33.30 138.2 31.44 25.71 11.83 3.94 16.97 22.75
Member States: While during the 1990s the speed of convergence of the national in-
°ation di®erentials was on average nearly two years, or 24 months (hereby we do not
take into account Belgium, France and Luxembourg, the countries for which the null
of a non-convergent behavior could not be rejected at standard con¯dence levels),
in the second subsample posterior to the monetary uni¯cation (EMU Stage III) the
average speed of convergence of the in°ation gaps in the EMU was nearly eighteen
months, or one and a half years. For comparison Beck and Weber (2005) calcu-
late half-lives for the interregional in°ation rate di®erentials in the U.S., Canada
and Japan between six months and one year. The EMU thus, compared with these
economies { the other monetary union comparable in size and economic character-
istics {, seems to exhibit a much higher degree of persistence in its in°ation rate
di®erentials, which could, if this behavior remains unchanged in the following years,
represent a problem for the conduction of monetary policy and the balanced macroe-
conomic development of the EMU Member States, as discussed before.
Respecting the stationarity of the in°ation gaps in subperiod posterior to the
20monetary uni¯cation, we ¯nd that while the null hypothesis of stationary cannot
be rejected for Austria, Belgium Germany, Spain, Luxembourg and Portugal, only
for Belgium and Luxembourg we ¯nd statistical support for a stationarity of their
in°ation di®erentials around the zero level. For all other mentioned countries, we
¯nd that the respective in°ation di®erentials are stationary around a nonzero level.
Table 3: National Annual In°ation Rate Di®erentials (to EMU average): KPSS
Stationarity Tests.
Subsample: 1998:1 - 2005:12
Country AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA ITA LUX NLD PRT





const -.0023 -.0008 -.0061 .0097 -.0052 -.0043 .0029 .0009 .0039 .0099
t-stat .0000 .0893 .0000 .0000 .0030 .0000 .0000 .0809 .0000 .0000
Note:
y denotes rejection at the 5% level according to Kwiatkowsky et al. (1992, Tab.1).
According to the KPSS test results shown in table 3, we can categorize the EMU
countries in three subgroups22 a below-average in°ation group, an above-average
in°ation group, and a subgroup with non-stationary in°ation behavior. In the ¯rst
one, consisting of Austria, Belgium and Germany, the national in°ation rate di®eren-
tials are stationary around a below-average level. In the second subgroup, composed
of Spain, Luxembourg and Portugal, the in°ation rate di®erentials rather °uctuate
around an above-average level. In the third subgroup, consisting of Finland, France,
Italy, and the Netherlands, the null of stationary in°ation rate di®erentials around
a constant level can be rejected at the 5% level: all countries in this subgroup, even
Italy and the Netherlands after showing pronouncedly positive in°ation rate di®er-
entials between 1998 and 2003, show increasingly negative in°ation rate di®erentials
in the past three years.
Additionally, we computed stationarity tests for the national in°ation di®eren-
tials to the Maastricht criteria consistent levels, that is, to the average in°ation of
the three countries with the lowest in°ation rates. Indeed, since other candidates to
join EMU as Bulgaria and Romania still have to ful¯ll the Maastricht convergence
criteria, it would be interesting to investigate whether the countries already mem-
bers in EMU would still ful¯ll such criteria.We thus rede¯ne the national in°ation
di®erentials not relative to the EMU average, but relative to the average of the three
22The categorization of ECB (2003, p.7) of the EMU countries in high and low in°ation countries
is in line with our results.
21countries with the (at each period) highest price stability.
Table 4: National Annual In°ation Rate Di®erentials (to Maastricht Criterion):
KPSS Stationarity Tests.
Sample: 1998:1 - 2005:12










const .0051 .0066 .0001 .0172 .0022 .0031 .0104 .0084 .0114 .0173
t-stat .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0030 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
Note:
y denotes rejection at the 5% level according to Kwiatkowsky et al. (1992, Tab.1).
Table 4 shows the results of the KPSS stationarity tests: As it can be observed,
for nearly all countries the null hypothesis of stationary in°ation di®erentials around
the level consistent with the Maastricht criteria can be rejected. If the EMU coun-
tries where to enter the EMU now, nearly none of them would ful¯ll the convergence
criteria of the Maastricht Treaty.
3.2 Multiple Series Convergence and Stationarity Tests
Besides investigating the dynamic behavior of the national in°ation di®erentials
through single equation tests, we use multiple series or panel tests. As discussed in
Breitung and Pesaran (2005), the panel approach has additional advantages with
respect to the univariate analysis of the previous section, since it allows to extract
more information from the cross sectional dimension, if the analyzed time series are
expected to exhibit a similar behavior. Additionally, this procedure allows to identify
convergence \clubs" or subgroups, by the statistical test of a similar autoregressive
term.23
We use two di®erent types of panel unit root tests for our analysis: the mul-
tivariate versions of the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests (the latter reported in the
appendix) as proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999) and by Choi (2001) and the
Breitung (2000) test.
The Breitung (2000) test is a two-step procedure which is based on the following
23See e.g. Busetti et al. (2006).
22equation




i;t± +²i;t with i = 1;2;:::N; t = 1;2;:::;T:
(7)
where X0
i;t contains as exogenous terms an intercept and a linear trend. As it can be
observed in eq.(7), the Breitung test allows for a di®erent cross-sectional lag order,
but assumes that the autoregressive coe±cient (Á) is cross-sectionally equal, so that
the null of a unit root process
H0 : Á = Ái = 0; 8 i:
is tested against H1 : Á < 0. In the ¯rst step of the Breitung procedure, 'i;t and
¢'i;t are regressed on the lagged terms ¢'i;t¡j to correct for autocorrelation.
In the second step, the (standarized) residuals ¹ 'i;t and ¢¹ 'i;t are used to calcu-























0 if no intercept or trend
~ 'i;t with intercept, no trend
~ 'i;1 ¡ ((t ¡ 1)=T)~ 'i;t with intercept and trend




Breitung (2000) shows that Á is asymptotically normal distributed.
By means of these panel convergence tests, as also done in previous studies as
Beck and Weber (2005) and Busetti et al. (2006), we can con¯rm the results obtained
by univariate unit root tests shown in table 1: As shown by the panel ADF tests
in table 5, for the subgroup consisting of Austria, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands
and Portugal, the null hypothesis of a joint process of absolute convergence cannot
be rejected for the period prior to the introduction of the euro. Our strategy to
identify this subgroup was as follows: Due to the de¯nition of the null hypothesis in
24See Eviews 5 (2004, p.521).
23Table 5: National Annual In°ation Rate Di®erentials (to EMU average): Panel ADF
and Breitung Unit Root Tests





¤ Br. t-stat p-val
¤
EU10 43.58 .0017 -3.660 .0001 .1393 .5554
NCG1: EU10-PRT 37.59 .0044 -3.309 .0005 .2779 .6095
NCG2: NCG1-AUT 31.77 .0107 -2.943 .0016 .5563 .7110
NCG3: NCG2-ESP 26.02 .0257 -2.547 .0054 .7489 .7730
NCG4: NCG3-DEU 20.67 .0554 -2.145 .0159 .8968 .8151
NCG5: NCG4-NLD 15.56 .1128 -1.715 .0431 1.0566 .8547
NCG6: NCG5-FIN 11.17 .1918 -1.308 .0953 -.4835 .3144
EUCG1=fAUT,DEU,ESP,NLD,PRTg 28.02 .0018 -3.460 .0003 -.953 .1703
* Probability values assuming asymptotic Chi-Square distribution.
the panel context (where under the null all series in the panel possess a unit root,
common or individual), we dropped stepwise from the group of EMU members we
analyzed the countries for which the null of a unit root (and therefore the hypothesis
of non-convergence) could be rejected at standard signi¯cance level by means of the
ADF unit root (with no intercept) test results of table 1. This stepwise procedure
allowed us to identify the subgroup of non-convergent countries, and residually, also
the subgroup of convergent countries. Hereby we oriented at the multivariate version
of the ADF tests, primarily due to comparability of results of table 3 and 5. For
comparison we show also the resulting statistics from the Breitung panel unit root
tests. Nevertheless, since under the null of these panel tests all series have a common
autoregressive term Á, these tests impose more restriction under the null than the
multivariate versions of the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests.
In sum our ¯ndings con¯rm the test results of the above mentioned studies con-
cerning the convergence of the national in°ation di®erentials prior to the monetary
uni¯cation and a somewhat divergence thereafter. Especially we do not ¯nd support
for a hypothesis of stationary in°ation rate di®erentials around a zero mean, since
as Busetti et al. (2006, p.21) state, when applying a multivariate stability test on
a 11-dimensional vector of all (pairwise) in°ation di®erentials obtain that \the null
hypothesis is clearly rejected when testing without an intercept term while it cannot
be rejected [...] if an intercept is included. Thus, while in°ation rates within the
24EMU can be considered jointly stationary over the period 1998-2004, they appear to
°uctuate around di®erent means, forming two or possibly three convergence clubs."
Keeping in mind the cumulative e®ects which persistently above or below av-
erage in°ation rates can have on the competitiveness of domestic products in the
international markets of goods and services, this ¯ndings rise serious concerns on
the adequacy of the Maastricht convergence criteria prior, and the absence of them
at all after the entrance of future candidates for joining EMU. As discussed before,
persistently above-(below-)average in°ation rate levels are likely to a®ect the rela-
tive level of economic activity of the monetary union's member countries through
the real interest and exchange rate channel, and might represent a threat for their
medium run competitiveness if they are not supported by accordant productivity
growth developments.
4 Structural Analysis on In°ation Di®erentials and Busi-
ness Cycles Fluctuations in the EMU
In this section I investigate, by means of econometric methods, the sources of in-
°ation rate di®erentials in the EMU before and after the introduction of the euro.
Hereby we focus on the link between the dynamics of the relative price in°ation and
the relative country-speci¯c level of economic activity to the euro area average.
The methodological approach of this section resembles the one of Honohan and
Lane (2003), who investigated the existence of in°ation di®erentials in the EMU
using di®erent price indices by means of pooled OLS and GMM estimation meth-
ods. Their main empirical ¯ndings concerning the main determinants of in°ation
di®erentials in EMU can be summarized as follows:
² The coe±cient of the lagged price level, a proxy for the price level convergence
within EMU, enters signi¯cantly and with the right sign in all speci¯cations.
² The rate of change of the nominal e®ective exchange rate (a measure for the
pass-through) in°uences signi¯cantly the in°ation gaps calculated with all used
price indices.
² The ¯scal surpluses are found to be insigni¯cant in all speci¯cations with the
exception of the in°ation gap based on the private consumption de°ator, where
the ¯scal surplus is found to be only marginally signi¯cant.
25² The e®ect the output gap is positive and statistically signi¯cant for all in°ation
di®erentials but the one calculated with the import price index.
This study nevertheless di®ers from Honohan and Lane (2003) in that while they
used a panel approach with ¯xed e®ects to ¯nd joint e®ects among the EMU coun-
tries, the focus here is to determine the country speci¯c role of the national business
cycles positions, import price in°ation and real marginal costs developments for the
in°ation di®erentials.
4.1 Theoretical Foundations
Concerning the empirical study of in°ation and more especi¯cally, of the in°ation
di®erentials in the EMU, the majority of existing empirical investigations such as
Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004), von Hagen and Hofmann (2004) and Hofmann and
Remsperger (2005) use the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve as the starting
point of their econometric estimations. Indeed, during the last decade, New Keyne-
sian style models have become the standard workhorse of structural macroeconomic
analysis in the majority of academic and policy-maker circles. Set in an intertempo-
ral utility maximizing framework, the type of models discussed in Roberts (1995),
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999) explain in°ation as
the result of a Calvo (1983) staggered price setting by monopolistic ¯rms which, un-
der the assumption that wages are perfectly °exible, reset their prices in an optimal
manner when they obtain the opportunity to do so. Under this theoretical setting,
the resulting adjustment equation for aggregate price in°ation, known as the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve,25 is expressed as
¼t = yt + Et[¼t+1]: (8)
where yt denotes the output gap and Et[¼t+1] denotes the expected in°ation at t+1
based on the information set available at t.
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve, as discussed for example in Mankiw (2001),
Estrella and Fuhrer (2002), Rudd and Whelan (2005) and Blanchard and Gal¶ ³ (2005)
has, despite of its solid microfoundations, two main empirical shortcomings: In the
¯rst place, it implies a negative relationship between the rate of change of in°ation
25See Walsh (2003) for an extensive discussion of the theoretical derivation of the New Keynesian
Phillips Curve.
26and the output gap, while the opposite holds in the majority of countries. In the sec-
ond place, eq.(8) explains in°ation as only dependent on the actual output gap and
on the future expected in°ation, with past in°ation being completely irrelevant for
its actual level. Aggregate macroeconomic data shows, on the contrary, a high de-
gree of in°ation persistence not only in the U.S. but in the majority of industrialized
countries. In order to account for the high degree of autocorrelation observable in
aggregate in°ation data, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999) and Gal¶ ³, Gertler and L¶ opez-Salido
(2001) have proposed a hybrid version New Keynesian Phillips Curve:
¼t = Àt + Et[¼t+1] + ¼t¡1; (9)
where actual in°ation does not depend only on future expected, but also on past
in°ation and additionally not the output gap y, but À, the log deviation of the
real marginal costs from their steady state value (the actual variable derived by the
theoretical New Keynesian model) is included. Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999) justify their
modi¯cation concerning the past in°ation in°uence through the assumption of\rule
of thumb"-led ¯rms which, when unallowed to reset their prices optimally, increase
them according to the last in°ation rate.
Apart from the empirical caveats concerning the New Keynesian Phillips Curve,
its very much essence concerning its perception of reality has been questioned in
a a variety of recent papers as Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) and Blanchard
and Gal¶ ³ (2005). The main argument which has been put on the table is that
empirical evidence suggests that not prices, but actually nominal wages should be
considered as sticky. The high autocorrelation of in°ation, or in other words its
signi¯cant persistence, is caused primarily by the sluggishness of the nominal unit
labor costs (that is, nominal wages corrected from labor productivity) and not by the
sluggishness of the price level per se. Based on this notion, Erceg et al. (2000) and
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) have developed, again in an intertemporal
utility maximizing framework, theoretical models with both staggered wages and
prices, where nominal wages, staggered also in a Calvo (1983) manner, are set in a
monopolistic manner by the households.26
We leave nevertheless these critical considerations on the New Keynesian ap-
proach aside in the empirical analysis of this section and proceed in a rather a-
26Alternatively to the New Keynesians, other researchers as Fair (2000), or Chiarella, Flaschel
and Franke (2005) have modelled wage and price in°ation dynamics through two separate Phillips
Curves, for both price and nominal wage in°ation, the latter with di®erent measures of demand
pressure { the labor market on nominal wages and the goods market on prices { and more elaborated
expectation schemes.
27theoretical way which does not constrain our speci¯cation to a speci¯c theoretical
approach, but rather include freely di®erent variables which are presumed to ex-
plain actual in°ation by these and other di®erent schools of economic thought. More
speci¯cally, we include besides the expected future and past in°ation also the log-
deviation of the real marginal costs from their long run mean À, the growth rate of
the nominal unit labor costs ¼ulc, or in other words, the nominal wage in°ation rate
corrected by the growth rate of labor productivity and ¼m, the import price in°ation
since, as discussed by Goodhart and Hofmann (2005, p.762), \omitting oil prices,
commodity prices or import prices from the empirical Phillips Curve may give rise
to a downwards biased estimate of the output gap coe±cient, which may explain
Mehra's (2004) ¯nding that the signi¯cance of the output gap can be restored when
supply shocks are included in the empirical model." Indeed, as discussed in ECB
(2005, p.63-64), the main contributors to the observed in°ation di®erentials in the
euro area have been internal factors such as national unit labor costs and gross op-
erating surpluses, and in relatively more open economies as the Netherlands and
Belgium, the import prices. The below average development of the unit labor costs
in Germany and France since the introduction of the euro also explain the negative
in°ation gap of these two countries with respect to the euro area average.
Our general speci¯cation can be thus expressed as
¼t = c + ¯yyt¡1 + ¯ÀÀt¡1 + ·fEt[¼t+1] +
J X
j=1
·b;j ¼t¡j + ·m¼m
t + ·w¼ulc
t (10)
In the same manner, we estimate the national in°ation di®erentials according to
't = c + ¯y~ yt¡1 + ¯À~ Àt¡1 + ·fEt['t+1] +
J X
j=1
·b;j 't¡j + ·m'm
t + ·w'ulc
t (11)
where~denotes the deviation of real variables (output gap and real unit labor costs)
from the euro area average, and ' denotes the gap of price in°ation, import price
in°ation and the growth nominal unit labor costs with respect to the euro average.
4.2 Econometric Analysis
Since our main objective is to detect the principal di®erences in the in°ation (and
in°ation di®erential) determination between the EMU countries, we perform as ¯rst
individual estimations of these two variables by means of the GMM (Generalized
28Method of Moments) methodology.27 This estimation procedure, developed on the
work by Hansen (1982), is basically an instrumental variables estimation procedure,
which nevertheless does not rely on any assumption concerning the distribution of
the estimation residuals but instead, as a minimum distance estimator, seeks to
optimize a determined objective function. The GMM estimator of ¯ is a vector
^ ¯

















where Z is the matrix of instrumental variables, X the matrix of explanatory vari-
ables, y the vector of explained variables and ^ W a symmetric, positive semide¯nite
weighting matrix which particular form is to be chosen. For the estimations dis-
cussed below, we used a weighting matrix which allows the GMM estimates to be
robust against possible heteroskedasticity as well as serial correlation (of any order
and form) in the error terms. The parameter values were computed through simul-
taneous updating of the HAC (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent)
weighting matrix and the matrix of parameters, whereas the parameter convergence
criterion was set to 0.001.
The use of a instrumental variables estimator as GMM is also adequate since it
allows to account for eventual regressor endogeneity, in the case that some of the
explaining variables are not completely exogenous. Additionally, since among the
explaining variables contained in our general speci¯cation there are also expected
future variables, the use of an instrument set composed solely by lagged variables
allows to approximate the expected values of those forward-looking variables on the
basis of the information available at time t. In order to test for the validity of the
overidentifying restrictions (since we have more instrumental variables as coe±cients
to be estimated) we calculate the J-statistics as proposed by Hansen (1982).
We performed our single-equation GMM estimations of the in°ation rate and in-
°ation di®erentials adjustment equations according to eqs.(10) and (11) for Germany
(DEU), France (FRA), Spain (ESP), Italy (ITA) and the Netherlands (NLD) includ-
ing alternatively di®erent measures of aggregate demand pressure on in°ation in the
set of explaining variables: The cyclical components of the industrial production in-
dices and the national GDPs at constant 1995 prices calculated by the asymmetric
27For a comprehensive discussion of the GMM methodology see Hayashi (2000) and Wooldridge
(2001).
28See Wooldridge (2002, p.190).
29band-pass ¯lter of Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) and by the Hodrick-Prescott
Filter, the utilization rate of capacity and the output gap according to the OECD
methodology (shown in ¯gure 5). In the set of instrumental variables we included
the four lags of price in°ation, the respective measure of aggregate demand, import
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Figure 5: Measures of aggregate demand pressure: GDP at constant 1995 prices (Ho-
drick Prescott and asymmetric Christiano-Fitzgerald cyclical components), capacity
utilization rate of the business sector and output gap (OECD series)
While the output gap series, calculated by the OECD, did not turn out to pos-
sess any explaining power for the analyzed economies, with the exception of France,
the use of the cyclical components of the real GDP computed by the asymmetric
Christiano-Fitzgerald methodology delivered results quite similar to the ones ob-
tained with the more standard Hodrick Prescott ¯ltered GDP series. Therefore we
discuss here only two estimated equation for each country, obtained with the HP ¯l-
tered GDPs and the capacity utilization rates as measures of the aggregate demand.
30The obtained GMM parameter estimates are reported in table 6.
Table 6: Single-Equation GMM Estimation Results. Aggregate Demand Proxy:
GDP at constant 1995 prices (HP Filter Cyclical Components)
Sample: 1990:1 - 2005:12
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As it can be observed in table 6, the coe±cient of aggregate demand pressure
¯y | proxied in this speci¯cation by the Hodrick-Prescott ¯ltered GDP at constant
1995 prices | enters signi¯cantly in both the in°ation rate and the in°ation di®eren-
tials equation of all analyzed countries with exception of Germany, where it possess
signi¯cant explanatory power only in the ¯rst equation. Respecting the extent of
such in°uence on the national in°ation di®erentials, table 6 shows that this is at
largest in Italy and at lowest in France.
Concerning the coe±cient of the real marginal costs, the ¯rst main determinant
of aggregate price in°ation in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, in table 6 it is
found to be statistically signi¯cant at standard con¯dence levels only in the in°ation
adjustment equations of France and Italy, and in the in°ation di®erential equation of
France. The second main determinant of in°ation according to the New Keynesian
approach, the expected future in°ation, is found to possess a signi¯cant and similar
explanatory power for the dynamics of the in°ation and the in°ation gaps of Italy
and the Netherlands.
Lagged price in°ation, as well as contemporaneous import price in°ation, enter
31in a signi¯cant { and concerning the dimension of their estimated coe±cients also
in a quite similar { manner in the in°ation adjustment equations of all ¯ve analyzed
countries, and with the exception of Italy, also of all in°ation rate di®erential equa-
tions. The sum of the coe±cients of lagged in°ation, often used as a persistence
measure, is found to be the largest in Spain. Finally, respecting the growth rate
of the nominal unit labor costs, these seem to account up to a certain degree the
di®erence between the Dutch in°ation rate and the euro area average, a result which
is consistent with the empirical stylized facts discussed in ECB (2003).
Departing from these single-equation GMM estimation results, we focus now
on the e®ect of the aggregate demand pressure on in°ation before and after the
introduction of the euro. Hereby we rely on the single-estimation results provided
by table 6 and estimate by panel two-stage least squares (TSLS) a reduced form of
eq.(10), where only lagged price in°ation, contemporaneous import price in°ation
and the proxy for aggregate demand pressure enter as explanatory variables, not
including the expected future in°ation, which was found to be signi¯cant only in
Italy and Spain, allows a certain consistency between our single-equation and panel
estimation results.29
Due to the increased sample size which is obtained by a panel estimation proce-
dure, we split our analyzed sample in a pre- and a post-euro subperiod, 1990:1-1997:4
and 1998:1-2005:4, respectively. According to the discussion of the previous section,
we would expect an increased in°uence of the national business cycle position on the
aggregate in°ation after the monetary uni¯cation due to the disappearance of the
country-speci¯c nominal exchange rates. In order to increase the degrees of freedom
of the panel estimation and due to the similarity of the estimated coe±cients of the
past CPI and present import price in°ation reported in table 6, we restrict their
coe±cient in the panel estimation to be the same across countries and allow only ¯y
to be country-speci¯c.
In both subsamples, the balanced panel contains 155 observations.30 We present
29Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004), Hofmann and Remsperger (2005), Goodhart and Hofmann
(2005), the ¯rst two concerning the in°ation rates and not their di®erentials, found by ¯xed-e®ects
panel estimation with euro area country data, that expected in°ation enters signi¯cantly in in°ation
adjustment equations based on the hybrid New Keynesian Phillis Curve. Nevertheless, we would
like to stress again that our estimated coe±cients were obtained in a free GMM estimation without
the use of constraints such as ·f + ·b;1 = 1, as for example done in these mentioned studies.
30The four quarters of 1998 are included in both subsamples due to the fact that, while the
euro o±cially was introduced at the beginning of 1998, it got into circulation among the public on
January 1999.
32in table 7 the estimation results for two speci¯cations, I and II. In I we used
the output gap (measured as the percent deviation of real GDP from the Hodrick-
Prescott trend as in the previous section) at t¡1, while in II the actual output gap
value was used.
Table 7: Panel Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation Results. Aggregate Demand
Proxy: GDP at constant 1995 prices (HP Filter Cyclical Components)
Sample: 1990:1 - 1998:4 Sample: 1998:1 - 2005:4
I II I II
coe®. t-stat p-val coe®. t-stat p-val coe®. t-stat p-val coe®. t-stat p-val
const. .0044 2.506 .0133 .0043 2.465 .0148 .0072 4.644 .0000 .0075 5.066 .0000
¼t¡1 .1700 2.768 .0064 .1745 3.166 .0019 - - - - - -
¼t¡4 .5737 10.36 .0000 .5693 11.84 .0000 .5648 12.78 .0000 .5716 12.09 .0000
¼m
t .0267 3.036 .0028 .0212 2.905 .0042 .0184 5.136 .0000 .0175 5.309 .0000
yDEU
t¡j .6405 1.919 .0569 -.8628 -1.294 .1974 .1969 .9232 .3574 .1886 0.674 .5011
yESP
t¡j .1352 0.647 .5182 .3233 1.324 .1875 .0635 .1732 .8627 .7126 1.977 .0499
yFRA
t¡j .5101 2.895 .0044 .1923 1.171 .2432 .1861 .6599 .5103 .1848 0.601 .5483
yITA
t¡j .2998 1.322 .1882 .6118 1.601 .1113 .4377 2.755 .0066 .6641 4.565 .0000
yNLD
t¡j .2493 1.098 .2740 .1150 0.412 .6804 .5088 2.224 .0276 .6048 2.089 .0384
¹ R2 .6063 .6095 .4158 .4218
DW 2.055 2.130 2.063 2.073
While the estimated coe±cients of past CPI in°ation and the actual import price
in°ation are quite stable across the four di®erent estimations reported in table 7, a
considerable variability concerning the coe±cients of the country-speci¯c aggregate
demand proxies between the two speci¯cations and also between the two analyzed
subsamples can be observed in table 7. Indeed, in speci¯cation I, for the ¯rst sub-
period we have positive, statistically signi¯cant and similar coe±cients only for Ger-
many and France. For the same subperiod, using not the past but the actual proxy
for excessive aggregate demand (speci¯cation II), we ¯nd insigni¯cant coe±cients
for all ¯ve analyzed countries at standard con¯dence levels.
Concerning the second subperiod, which comprises the monetary uni¯cation and
the adoption of the euro, we ¯nd that the coe±cient of aggregate demand turns out
to be highly signi¯cant in speci¯cation I for Italy and the Netherlands, and also for
Spain in speci¯cation II. Interestingly, the same coe±cient for France and Germany
loses signi¯cance with respect to the ¯rst subperiod.
33How are these somewhat puzzling results to be interpreted? There are di®erent
possible explanations: As a ¯rst alternative, the German reuni¯cation (and the
subsequent exceptional increase in the aggregate demand in Germany) might have
in°uenced to a signi¯cant extent not only the German, but also the behavior of
the price in°ation rates of the other European countries, as Spain, Italy and the
Netherlands during the ¯rst half of the 1990s. The monetary uni¯cation, as well as
the slowdown of the German economy in recent years, might have dampened the
e®ect of the German reuni¯cation, with the subsequent increase in the in°uence
of the own business cycles observed in our estimations for Spain, Italy and the
Netherlands in the second subperiod.
An alternative interpretation could be related with the pro-cyclicality of the
¯scal de¯cits resulting from the present formulation of the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP). The main argument goes as follows: Due to the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP) criteria, the possibilities to conduct a counter-cyclical ¯scal policy are
restricted to a budgetary de¯cit limit of 3% of the national GDP, and a level of
¯scal debt of 60% of GDP. This values, nevertheless, are no independent from the
economic performance of the economy: As it is widely known, the budgetary po-
sitions are highly pro-cyclical, with increasing tax revenues (and decreasing social
security expenses) in economic upswing phases and widening de¯cits in recessions.
In pronounced recession phases, as for example in Germany since the middle 1990s,
governments constraint by criteria as in the SGP, will increase indirect taxes in order
to reduce their ¯scal de¯cits, as for example is planned in Germany for 2007. Higher
taxes, nevertheless, are likely to lead to general increases the aggregate price levels,
contributing so to a counter-cyclical behavior of national in°ation rates.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I investigated the reasons for the existence and the dynamic behavior
of the national in°ation rates in the European Monetary Union from both the the-
oretical as well as from the empirical point of view. Among other things, I found
statistical evidence for a persistent upward or downward bias of national in°ation
di®erentials of several EMU Member States. Taking into account that in a mone-
tary union as the EMU the development of the national price levels is central for
the homogeneity of the monetary policy impulses as well as for the international
competitiveness of the monetary union member countries, the presence of in°ation
34di®erentials persistently di®erent from zero indeed raises some concerns about the
future medium run macroeconomic development of the EMU members.
In order to identify the main determinants for the existence of in°ation di®eren-
tials in Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, I used a single-equation
GMM methodology. The estimation results shed some interesting insights across
the analyzed countries worth to be stressed: First, the e®ect of the relative business
cycle position of the economy is statistically signi¯cant for both the in°ation and in-
°ation di®erentials in all countries but Germany, where this only holds for in°ation.
Second, the degree of persistence, measured by the coe±cients of the lagged values
of in°ation, is signi¯cant and of similar extent in all analyzed countries for both
in°ation and in°ation di®erentials estimations. Despite the fact that this result is
to a signi¯cant degree only the re°ection of the persistence in the levels of the in°a-
tion rate, the importance of lagged values, as one of the main explaining variables
in the in°ation rate di®erentials, raises some concerns with respect to the probable
destabilizing e®ects that such a persistence might bring with in the medium run for
the EMU Member States and also for the EMU as a whole.
Concerning the second main topic in our analysis, namely the role of the national
business cycle positions for the respective in°ation dynamics, I found a signi¯cant
change of the signi¯cance of the business cycle position for the in°ation determina-
tion prior and after the introduction of the euro: While its in°uence seems to have
increased since the introduction of the euro in Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, the
opposite seems to hold in Germany and France.
These results, nevertheless, are not de¯nitive. The occurrence of extraordinary
events such as the German reuni¯cation, as well as the simultaneous in°uence of
contrarily acting e®ects and interplays might have weakened the accuracy of our
econometric estimations. With the availability of larger data sets for the EMU
Member States after the monetary uni¯cation, some of these open questions might
be answered in the future.
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41Appendix 1: Univariate and Panel Phillips-Perron Unit
Root Tests
Table 8: National Annual In°ation Rate Di®erentials (to EMU average): Univariate
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests
Subsample: 1990:1 - 1997:12 1998:1 - 2005:12
No Intercept With Intercept No Intercept
Country Á p-val
¤ Á p-val
¤ const. t-stat Á p-val
¤
AUT -.0544 .0544 -.1333 .0705 -.0010 .0557 -.1082 .0913
BEL -.0164 .3063 -.0545 .4976 -.0005 .2110 -.1502 .0494
DEU -.0366 .0688 -.0387 .5251 -3.8E-5 .8977 -.0293 .3467
ESP -.0369 .1016 -.0940 .3445 .0005 .1311 -.0182 .6087
FIN -.0313 .1115 -.0834 .0361 -.0013 .0082 -.0218 .3387
FRA -.0082 .3939 -.0323 .8142 -.0004 .3795 -.0372 .3134
ITA -.0264 .1332 -.0442 .5650 .0004 .4885 -.0793 .1558
LUX -.0228 .3209 -.1054 .3167 -.0012 .0609 -.3127 .0021
NLD -.0256 .0778 -.0229 .7787 4.7E-5 .8985 -.0400 .1440
PRT -.0217 .0499 -.0218 .6375 6.1E-6 .9933 -.0300 .1975
Note: * denotes MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Table 9: National Annual In°ation Rate Di®erentials (to EMU average): Panel
Phillips-Perron and Breitung Unit Root Tests





¤ Br. t-stat p-val
¤
EU10 42.10 .0027 -3.511 .0002 .1393 .5554
NCG1: EU10-PRT 36.58 .0059 -3.191 .0007 .2779 .6095
NCG2: NCG1-AUT 31.15 .0129 -2.853 .0022 .5563 .7110
NCG3: NCG2-ESP 26.30 .0237 -2.540 .0055 .7489 .7730
NCG4: NCG3-DEU 20.74 .0542 -2.116 .0172 .8968 .8151
NCG5: NCG4-NLD 15.32 .1206 -1.646 .0499 1.0566 .8547
NCG6: NCG5-FIN 10.69 .2195 -1.196c .1158 -.4835 .3144
EUCG1=fAUT,DEU,ESP,NLD,PRTg 26.77 .0028 -3.319 .0005 -.953 .1703
* Probability values assuming asymptotic Chi-Square distribution.
42Appendix 2: Single-Equation GMM Estimation Results
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¹ R2 = :3226 DW = 2:351 J-stat (p-val) = :1628 (:000)






















































~ yt¡1 + :0518
[:0098]


















































































































¹ R2 = :2943 DW = 2:385 J-stat = :1252
[¡]
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